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 
Abstract— Wireless communications with unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) offer a promising solution to provide cost-effective 
wireless connectivity and extend coverage. In recent years, the 
area of wireless communications for UAV system design and 
optimization has been receiving enormous attention from the 
research community. However, there are still existing challenges 
that are far from solved. To cope with those challenges, 
researchers have been exploring the applicability of game-
theoretic approaches. This paper surveys the existing game-
theoretic solutions and presents a number of novel solutions, which 
are designed to optimize energy consumption, enhance network 
coverage, and improve connectivity in wireless communications 
with UAVs. We present main game components and the elements 
they represent in wireless communications with UAVs first and 
then give a classification of the current used game-theoretic 
approaches. We identify main problems in wireless 
communications with UAVs in which game theory has been used 
to find solutions. We provide a case to show the merits of applying 
game theory in wireless communication with UAVs. Finally, we 
discuss shortcomings of the traditional game-theoretic approaches 
and propose mean field game (MFG) as an appropriate method 
for solving novel technical problems in massive UAVs networks. 
 
Index Terms— Game Theory, UAV, Wireless Communications 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
EVOLUTIONARY improvements in the technology of 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the past few decades 
have led to highly advanced UAVs that come in different 
shapes, sizes, capabilities, and functions. Nowadays UAVs are 
mounted with low cost and high performance commercial 
wireless transceivers such as cellular networks and the IEEE 
802.11 [1]. The use of UAVs for wireless communications is 
one of the most important applications, which is expected to 
play vital role in the future wireless networks. UAVs equipped 
with wireless transceivers can be used as relays for transmitting 
data. They can be deployed as an aerial base station to provide 
services to the areas without network infrastructure. Also, 
UAVs can be employed for collecting and delivering data 
between ground nodes. 
There are many advantages of using UAVs for wireless 
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communications over existing network infrastructures. Some of 
the benefits are as follows. 
 Cost effective: UAV-aided wireless communication 
systems are in general less expensive to build compared 
to a fixed ground base stations. Therefore, UAVs make 
proper tools for providing cost-effective wireless 
communications. 
 Swift and easy deployment: UAVs do not need a 
runway and move with high velocity. Because of that, 
they can quickly and efficiently be deployed whenever 
needed even in a hostile environment. Easy deployment 
of UAV networks to create an instant communication 
infrastructure is very useful in emergency situations, 
such as after a devastating natural disaster. 
 Maneuverability: Due to the advancement in 
technology, UAVs are designed with the capability to 
perform all kind of maneuvers. As a result, UAVs 
mounted with transceivers can be easily controlled and 
maneuvered when managing wireless connectivity. 
 Extend coverage: In a scenario where ground stations 
cannot communicate due to distance or obstructed line 
of sight (LoS), UAVs can act as relays to extend the 
coverage. UAVs can also be used as aerial base stations 
in areas where there is no, or it is costly to build cellular 
infrastructure. 
 Enhance connectivity: Because of their 
maneuverability, the movement and position of UAVs 
can be optimized to improve network connectivity. 
Moreover, connectivity improves significantly when 
UAV based relays are used compared to the traditional 
ad-hoc ground networks. 
 Improve performance: The maneuverability of UAVs 
through the dynamic adjustment of their states to best 
suit for the communication environment, and with the 
aid of short-range LoS of low-altitude UAVs can lead to 
a significant network performance improvement. 
 Data transmission: The Internet of Things (IoT) is 
expected to revolutionize the way we interact with the 
physical world. There will be massive data transfers 
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between devices that cannot communicate over a long 
range with a small transmission power. To facilitate and 
ease data transfer, wireless communications with UAVs 
can provide a means to collect the IoT data. 
In addition, compared to satellites, terrestrial or high altitude 
platforms, which have longer endurance and wider coverage, 
UAVs have several advantages. First, they are cost-effective 
and can swiftly be deployed within a short duration. Second, 
they are more flexible in reconfiguration and movement, which 
can enhance network performance. Furthermore, in most 
scenarios, UAVs can establish a short-distance LoS 
communication that improves the communication performance. 
Deployments of UAVs for wireless communications come 
with many advantages but also with novel technical challenges. 
Due to the UAVs high speed, there are rapid changes in link 
quality, which needs suitable technology for UAV-UAV links 
and new communication protocol design. Finding optimal 
height for maximum communication coverage, proper root path 
for the UAVs and UAV's collision avoidance mechanisms are 
among the major challenges. As more and more UAVs are 
expected to be deployed in the future, advanced multi-UAV 
coordination techniques, resource allocation and interference 
management schemes, and security mechanisms have to be 
designed and developed [2]. 
Currently, researchers have started utilizing game-theoretic 
approaches for addressing issues in wireless communications 
with UAVs [3]. Game theory offers many advantages over the 
conventional methods. First, game theory deals with different 
problems, where multiple players with contradictory objectives 
strategically interact with each other in a competition. 
Therefore, game theory is a natural tool that can be used to 
characterize the rational behaviors of multiple players. Second, 
game theory can be used to model interactions between agents, 
analyze equilibrium and design distributed algorithms. 
Moreover, game theory has the capability of examining 
thousands of possible scenarios before taking the best action 
[4]. In summary, it provides a mathematical framework for 
analyzing and modeling problems. However, there lacks a 
survey of game theory for wireless communications with 
UAVs. This article provides a better understanding of the 
current research issues and presents game-theoretic solutions, 
which are designed to optimize wireless communications with 
UAVs networks. We identify and classify the existing game-
theoretic approaches applied in wireless communication with 
UAVs. We highlight the major technical challenges and then 
summarize game-theoretic techniques used to solve the 
challenges. We provide a study case to show the benefits of 
using game theory. We also discuss interference problem and 
propose mean field game (MFG) as the best game model that 
fit the characteristics of massive UAV-aided network 
characteristics. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we give a brief introduction to game theory and present main 
game components and the elements they represent in wireless 
communications with UAVs. We also provide a simple 
classification of the current used game-theoretic approaches. In 
section III, we survey the existing game-theoretic solutions 
which are designed to optimize energy consumption, enhance 
network coverage, connectivity and network security. We 
provide a cooperative game case in section IV. We introduce 
the interference problem, highlight the limitations of traditional 
game-theoretic models, and introduce MFG as an effective 
model for solving interference problems in massive UAVs 
systems in section V, followed by the conclusion in Section VI. 
II.  GAMES IN WIRELESS COMMUNICATION WITH UAVS 
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics, which 
analyzes and describes the strategic interaction among multiple 
decision-makers. The strategic interaction activities are referred 
as the games, where each decision-maker chooses the action 
that gives its own maximum possible outcome at the same time 
predicting the rational decision taken by the others. 
In game theory, entities or individuals who make decisions 
and perform the actions are referred to as players. The moves 
taken by players in a particular game are the actions. The 
descriptions of how a player can play a game are called 
strategies. They are a complete plan of actions in all possible 
situations throughout the game. The payoff, also known as a 
reward is what players receive at the end of the game contingent 
upon the actions of all other players in the game. The payoff is 
determined by the individual action together with the actions of 
the competitors.   
In the current applications of game theoretic approaches in 
wireless communications with UAVs, three main components 
of a game, i.e., players, strategies, and payoffs are represented 
by different elements of the wireless networks. For instance, 
UAVs and ground nodes can be represented as players. 
Beaconing periods scheduling, task servicing, relocating UAVs 
coordinates, and intruder evasion are examples of the strategies 
taken by players. Payoffs can be represented by the elements 
such as a successful encounter with the ground nodes, reduction 
of energy consumption, performance improvement, coverage 
maximization, and successful communication of players in the 
presence of an intruder. All these depend on the specific 
applications of game theory to the specific technical problems. 
In general, game theory models can be classified into two 
main categories, which are non-cooperative and cooperative 
games. The existing game-theoretic approaches fall under the 
two branches as shown in Fig. 2.  
A. Cooperative game 
A cooperative game is a structure, in which the agents are 
allowed to form agreements as a group before choosing their 
actions. These plans can impact the strategic choices of the 
players as well as their utilities. Cooperative games are often 
analyzed through predictions on the coalitions that will be 
formed, the actions that groups take jointly and the resulting 
collective payoffs. Examples of cooperative games applied in 
wireless communication with UAVs are coalition formation 
game [3] for task allocation and cooperative differential game 
[9] for network security. 
  
 
3 
 
B. Non-cooperative games 
Contrary to the cooperative game theory, non-cooperative 
game theory studies strategies among strategically interactive 
players. The goal of a player is to maximize its payoff (or 
minimize its cost) by choosing its best strategy individually and 
rationally. In other words, each player is selfish but rational in 
a non-cooperative game. The games are mainly applied in 
power control, distributed resource allocation, coordination of 
height and position of UAVs, congestion control, UAVs 
coverage optimization, and spectrum sharing. There exist 
various kinds of non-cooperative games. Non-cooperative 
differential games [5], N-player normal-form games [6], 
Bayesian games [7], and sub-modular games [8] are examples 
of non-cooperative games applied in solving various technical 
problems in wireless communications with UAVs networks. 
III. APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY IN WIRELESS 
COMMUNICATIONS WITH UAVS 
Game-theoretic properties have been used to solve various 
types of challenges in wireless communications with UAVs. 
Non-cooperative games have been used to optimize power and 
energy, find optimal height and coverage, and perform 
coordination control of the UAVs. The cooperative game has 
been applied for tasks allocation and performance efficiency 
problems. Here, we choose several typical game applications as 
examples to characterize the rational behaviors, analyze the 
equilibrium solutions, and design the distributed schemes in 
wireless communications with UAVs. 
A. Energy Saving and Power Optimization 
Energy consumption optimization is one of the major 
challenges. With the rapid growth of applications with high data 
rate such as online video streaming and games, more and more 
energy is consumed. The challenge becomes even more critical 
when battery-powered UAVs are applied for wireless 
communications. The operational, performance, and 
availability duration of UAV are restricted by the limited 
energy on board. Fig. 1 shows different ways by which a UAV 
can lose energy. UAVs consume power to overcome its weight 
so as to stay in the air, as well as for various kinds of motions 
and maneuvers. Moreover, energy is needed to maintaining 
inter-UAV communication links such as UAV-UAV, UAV-
mobile, UAV-ground control station, and UAV-satellite 
communication links. 
Improvement in the battery life and energy storage 
technologies, the use of low-power components and lightweight 
materials in building drones have not been enough to mitigate 
the UAV energy problem. From the operational point of view, 
the problem can be addressed by introducing energy efficiency 
operations to reduce UAVs unnecessary power consumption 
during the operation. In addition, researchers have suggested 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Different ways by which UAVs consume energy 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Classification of current applied game theoretic approaches in wireless communications with UAVs 
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several methods for optimizing UAVs energy consumption 
such as the UAV circular maneuvering [10]. Such method and 
others need central authority to control and allocate UAVs to 
their optimal locations and paths, which increases the energy 
consumption of UAVs due to the increase of signal overhead. 
Game theory approaches can allow the UAVs to operate 
autonomously, therefore minimize power consumption. 
As an efficient means of power optimization, authors in [8] 
proposed the use of periodic beaconing for UAVs acting as 
aerial base stations in a wireless communication system. The 
authors modeled the beaconing periods scheduling by using a 
non-cooperative sub-modular game in which the UAVs are 
considered as players who compete to maximize their coverage 
probability of the mobiles in the area of interest. Each UAV 
send a beacon to the mobiles for a specific duration period. A 
game 
{ } { }{ ,{ },{ }}i N i NG N A u  with N being the set of 
UAVs, iA  set of action and iu  the payoff of UAVi. The payoff 
function is formulated, which is the difference between the 
successful encounter rate and energy consumption during the 
beaconing period. With the provided learning framework, 
UAVs are allowed to reach the equilibrium, then the existence 
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are checked, and 
simulations with different encounter rates were done. 
The sub-modular game results show that at the equilibrium 
point the UAVs efficiently optimize their energy consumption 
and at the same time maximize the possibility of contacting the 
mobile user on the ground. 
The non-cooperative games in [11] and [12], while designed 
to find the optimal placement for maximum coverage of the 
ground mobiles, allows decisions about radio resource and 
navigation to be made onboard the UAV without reference to 
other agents. The non-cooperative games use time-stamped 
broadcasts from the mobiles and UAVs to derive complete 
information about strategies and payoffs. In this way, the UAVs 
are allowed to operate with high degree of autonomy and 
without the need for central planning authority. Therefore, the 
power required to be assigned to the inter-UAV links, UAV-
ground control station link, and the associated communication 
traffic is minimized. 
 
 
B. Optimal Height and Coverage 
The altitude at which the UAV is positioned has a significant 
impact on the power usage, coverage performance, service 
availability and link reliability over the area that it provides 
service. Fig. 3 demonstrates how a UAV at different altitudes 
can have different ground coverage. When the UAVs are 
properly positioned, the number of UAVs required to provide 
coverage can be significantly reduced which results in a 
reduction of resources and time to establish the network. 
Therefore, determining the optimal height for maximum 
coverage becomes one of the important research topics. 
Game theory concepts have also been applied to find the 
optimal height and coverage in wireless communication UAVs. 
The author in [11] uses a non-cooperative game to determine 
the optimal placement of two UAVs that provide 
communications to a community of ground mobiles. In this 
game, the UAVs are the players with two sets of strategies that 
can be used to cover the ground mobiles uniquely. The first set 
of strategies contains the choices of next location that the UAVs 
can take. The other set comprises of the choices to change the 
altitude during maneuver; this can be ascending, descending or 
maintaining the altitude depending on the landscape. The aim 
of UAVs is to choose strategies that will maximize the number 
of ground mobiles they can support. The UAVs are allowed to 
find its optimum location based on the location of the mobiles. 
The results indicate that the UAVs engaged in a competitive 
game can find its optimum height and significantly better 
coverage than a single circling UAV. This is because when two 
UAVs are used, the communications payloads allocated to the 
support of mobiles is shared between two UAVs, compared to 
the use of one UAV which will allocate all of its payload power 
to the support of mobiles. 
 In [12], three UAVs were used to find their optimum 
location using a non-cooperative game. In this game, the UAVs 
are the players. Each player, being mindful of the activity of the 
other players, strives to maximize their support of mobiles. 
Their strategies are the next move choices. The payoffs for the 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Area coverage from different heights of UAVs 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Ground control station for coordinating UAVs  
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players is calculated by a three-stage process. First, by 
calculating the link budgets of the radio frequency power 
required to provide the backbone between UAVs. Then the link 
budgets of all mobiles from each UAV. And the last process is 
by calculating the other weights such as retaining, adding or 
dropping mobile. The results indicate that the non-cooperative 
game offers a useful technique for coordinating the movement 
of communications UAVs on area coverage missions and 
increasing the number of UAVs improves the total coverage. 
The use of game theory in finding the optimal height and 
coverage permits the UAVs to make decisions about radio 
resources and navigation on board without the need for a central 
planning agency. The UAV-ground control communication 
overhead is minimized, saving power which is directed to 
providing coverage. The major drawback of these games is that 
they do not account for the interference between UAVs and do 
not take into consideration UAV-UAV connectivity quality. 
C. Coordination of UAVs 
In a scenario where many UAVs are deployed, it is expected 
that more complex systems of selfish individual UAVs with 
different missions and coalitions will be formed. In order to 
accomplish their missions and maximize the number of mobiles 
that UAVs can support with the maximum throughput and 
minimum energy, each group or individual UAV will seek to 
find its optimal position and height, move with different speed 
at different heights and possibly in different directions. In such 
a scenario, better coordination mechanisms for sharing data 
have to be designed. Currently, UAVs coordination is primarily 
done by the ground control station as depicted in Fig. 4, where 
each UAV or a group of UAVs require a ground controller. 
Better coordination will ensure the maximum coverage, better 
quality of service and good network connectivity. 
Non-cooperative game theory and evolutionary algorithms 
are among the technical approaches for coordinating UAVs. 
Authors in [13] compare the two methods for optimally locating 
the UAVs. A non-cooperative game mechanism considers 
UAVs as players that select the best actions to maximize their 
payoffs. Payoffs are the number of mobile users that the UAVs 
provide coverage. In this game the players have perfect 
information, therefore can determine other players strategies 
and payoffs. The players will choose the best strategy by 
changing their positions or heights until they attain equilibrium. 
At the Nash equilibrium, each UAV is expected to know the 
strategy selected by the others and determine which maneuver 
will undertake next. In the evolutionary algorithm approach, a 
master UAV which is responsible for running the algorithm and 
distributing the generated solutions is selected. The generated 
solutions consist of a set of flying instructions that allow 
maneuvering for each UAVs. Using predicted positions which 
based on recent coordination data of both mobiles and UAVs, 
the evaluation of the survival of the fittest UAV is estimated. 
During the evaluation, the resulting individual UAV coverage 
is estimated. 
The results in [13] show that the evolutionary algorithms 
converge on the optimal solution quicker than the non-
cooperative game due to their flexibility. Nevertheless, the non-
cooperative game has less risk of flying UAVs out of the 
operation area because of the use of more conservative flying 
maneuvers. Moreover, the UAVs driven by the non-cooperative 
game are found to distribute the load equally among themselves 
because the coverage is evenly divided among the UAVs. The 
distribution of load has led to a mission with power balanced 
which can offer benefits when managing interference of radio 
frequency between the platforms. Another advantage of using 
the game theory for coordination is that UAVs becomes 
autonomously and adaptively. 
D. Task Allocation and Performance Efficiency Optimization 
 UAVs in wireless communications can be assigned to 
perform different tasks such as collecting, transferring and 
delivering of data, and also monitoring of randomly located 
sites such as oil, gas, and water pipelines. Fig. 5 shows a 
scenario where different UAVs are assigned to perform various 
tasks in a network, and some tasks are performed by more than 
one UAV while others are not allocated to any of the UAV. 
With the continuous increase in traffic, applications, and 
services in the large-scale wireless systems, as a means to 
enhance performance, mechanisms for organizing and 
allocating tasks among UAVs are needed. Due to system 
complexity and dynamic nature of nodes and UAVs, centralized 
pre-generating and assigning tasks as a means of allocation 
tasks for the UAVs will not be practical. Therefore, the 
designed mechanisms have to allow self-organizing and self-
adapting of the network while performing and share randomly 
generated tasks allocation among UAVs. Researchers have 
started to use game theory to address this challenge. 
 
The authors in [3] modeled a hedonic coalition formation 
game between the agents and the tasks that interact to form 
disjoint coalitions. In this game, agents and tasks are the 
players. Agents act as collectors that collect the packets 
continuously from randomly located nodes or relays that 
wirelessly transmit the collected packets to a centralized 
receiver. Tasks represent a data source such as a group of 
mobile devices that require servicing, data generated from 
video surveillance or any other source of packet data that is to 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Different UAVs performing various tasks in a wireless network 
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be received and transmitted by the UAV. The cooperative 
groups containing a number of tasks and UAVs are formed 
according to the proposed algorithm. The UAVs belonging to 
the same coalition can arrange themselves onto relays and 
collectors. To optimize throughput and delay, the players can 
join or leave the coalition based on their preference. The payoff 
takes into account the benefits received from servicing a task, 
in terms of effective throughput as well as the cost in terms of 
delay incurred from the time needed for servicing all the tasks 
in a coalition. The payoff is then equally divided among the 
players. The results of the proposed hedonic coalition formation 
algorithm have shown that the UAVs and the tasks can self-
organize in forming coalitions and therefore improve average 
performance of UAVs compared to the scheme that allocates 
task equally among the UAVs. 
E. UAVs Network Security 
UAV-aided networks are exposed to attacks that could cause 
an enormous amount of loss regarding money, reputation and 
data confidentiality. Attackers can jam the communications 
between the UAV and controller, take control of a targeted 
UAV and launch another kind of attacks such as GPS spoofing. 
Therefore, an efficient security mechanism to protect such 
network against attackers is essential. Because of its ability to 
deal problems where multiple entities with contradictory 
objectives are involved, game theory technique can be used to 
model and analyze wireless network security issues. 
To protect the UAV-aided network against external and 
internal intruders, authors in [7] designed the intrusion 
detection system (IDS) and the intrusion ejection system (IES) 
for monitoring the network and ejection of the node that is 
anticipated to instigate an attack. Authors formulated two 
security game problems as a Bayesian game. The first game 
involves IDS and attackers as players who possess set of 
strategies, and a defined set of profit gained according to the 
strategies. Then the optimal solution defined as Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium (BNE) is determined, in which the attacker 
launches a malicious act and IDS activates its monitoring 
process before and during the malicious act. The second game 
is between the IES and suspicious nodes. In this game, when 
the node is categorized as an attacker by IES, it will first change 
its future state to either transitory or permanent. A BNE optimal 
solution is determined to check if the suspected node continues 
to be an attacker in future state, and if so, the IES will eject this 
suspected node before the attack. The performance of this 
approach based on the Nash Equilibrium concept has shown to 
incur a low overhead to detect lethal attacks with a high 
accuracy. 
 To compute optimal strategies for a team of UAVs evading 
the attack of an aerial jammer on the communication channel, 
the authors in [9] proposed a differential game theoretic 
approach. The model uses three nodes, receiver, transmitter and 
the attacker that is attempting to jam the communication 
channel between the transmitter and receiver by sending a high 
power noise at the same frequency. Two problems are 
formulated; the first one by considering that UAVs are initially 
not communicating in the presence of a jammer. In this first 
problem, the UAVs seeks to minimize the time for which 
communication remains jammed while the jammer aims to 
maximize the time for which it can jam the communication 
between UAVs. The second problem considers a situation in 
which UAVs are communicating in the presence of a jammer, 
which aims to minimize the time it can jam the communication 
channel between UAVs. Meanwhile, each UAV is trying to 
maximize the time for which they maintain the operation of the 
communication link between them. The problem was 
formulated as a zero-sum pursuit-evasion game and the 
necessary conditions to arrive at the equations governing the 
saddle point strategies of the players were derived. The cost 
function was formulated as the termination time of the game. 
The game renders a possible way of protecting the 
communication channel to malicious attacks from aerial 
intruders flying in the vicinity. 
IV. A COOPERATIVE BEACONING SCHEDULING STRATEGY 
BASED ON NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION: A CASE STUDY 
The current applied game theoretic approaches have shown 
promising potentials for solving problems in wireless 
communications with UAVs [7]. To verify the merits of 
carrying UAV-aided communications based on game theory, 
we present a cooperative beaconing periods scheduling game 
between two UAVs. Motivated by the scenario presented in [8], 
where two UAVs acting as aerial base stations provide network 
coverage to mobile users in a geographical area. In this 
scenario, to encounter a mobile user, the UAVs send beacons 
announcing their presence. Two UAVs seek to minimize their 
energy consumption by adopting a periodical probing strategy. 
Different from [8] where a sub-modular, non-cooperative game 
was used, we apply cooperative strategy based on the Nash 
bargaining solution (NBS) to find the optimal probing period to 
maximize UAVs encounter probability. More details on the 
NBS are given in [14]. The NBS strategy can achieve an 
optimal solution while maintaining fairness among UAVs. 
In this case study, the two-player bargaining problem is 
modeled. We first defined players' utility 
iU , which the UAV 
achieves when the beaconing period duration is allocated to it, 
and the minimum utility 
iU , which a UAV obtains when no 
agreement is reached in the bargaining process. Utility 
iU  is 
defined as the difference between the probability of the UAVs’ 
first encounter with the mobile and the cost involved. The cost 
is the energy consumed associated with sending a beacon and 
switching between states (i.e., probing/idle states). In this game, 
if a player receives a utility value less than 
iU , will quit the 
cooperation. Then a two-player NBS function is formulated as 
the product of the difference between the defined utilities, i.e., 
1 1 2 2( ) ( )U U U U   . The optimal beaconing periods of 
UAVs that give maximum values of the NBS function at 
various encounter rates are calculated. Finally, we provide 
simulation results to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed 
NBS. 
The optimal beaconing periods obtained using NBS for 
various values of encounter rates at three different cycle 
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durations can be seen in Fig. 6 (a). For different probing/idle 
cycling periods T, for example when T=20, T=10, and T=5, the 
optimal beaconing period durations start at high values for low 
values of encounter rates and decreases as the encounter rates 
increases. The results demonstrate that, when a UAV has a low 
probability of encountering a mobile, it will require longer 
probing period durations and vice versa. In addition, at Nash 
equilibrium, longer beaconing durations will be assigned to the 
UAVs with higher probing/idle durations compared to the ones 
with low probing/idle durations. Fig. 6 (b) presents the 
comparison of utilities that a UAV can achieve when applying 
three different strategies. The cooperative strategy can achieve 
higher payoff compared to the always-beaconing and non-
cooperative strategies. For the UAV that uses always-probing 
strategy, there is a linear trade-off between probing duration 
and energy consumption. As the probing duration increases, the 
probability of encountering a mobile and associated energy 
consumption increases as well. However, the UAVs that 
employ game theory can minimize the energy consumption 
involved through maximizing their payoff by obtaining the 
optimal probing period durations. Moreover, it can be seen in 
Fig. 6 (b), at the optimal solution, the NBS strategy receives 
higher reward compared to the non-cooperative strategy, which 
indicates that the cooperative strategy is more efficient in 
serving energy. This use case shows the potentials of game-
theoretic approaches in wireless communication with UAVs. 
V. NOVEL GAME-THEORETIC APPROACHES AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
In addition to the mentioned novel technical challenges, there 
exist other problems. In particular, here we concentrate on the 
interference problems in the massive UAVs communications, 
which calls for novel game-theoretic approaches. 
 
A. Interference Management for Massive UAVs 
Severe interference is one of the major challenges in 
designing and deployment of massive UAVs for 
communication systems. Interference has always been a key 
threat to wireless communications. Because self-organization 
networks of UAVs use the sharing wireless channel for 
transmitting information, they are facing complex wireless 
interference. In addition, the increasing demands of spectral 
efficiency, data rate, degrees of freedom, and network capacity 
due to the exponential growth of mobile users, it is expected 
that massive UAVs for wireless communications will be 
deployed. The large number of UAVs will intensify the 
interference problem, which can severely affect the 
performance of a wireless network. Moreover, since wireless 
communications in the air have line-of-sight propagation 
characteristics, the interference problem becomes more severe. 
Due to the mobility nature of UAVs, the use of wireless 
backhauls as well as the lack of centralized control, interference 
coordination among UAVs is more challenging than in 
terrestrial cellular systems. Therefore, special techniques for 
interference management specifically designed for UAV-
assisted wireless communication networks are needed. 
In a typical wireless communication with UAVs networks, 
there exist different types of interference as follows. 
 Interference from neighboring ground control stations 
(GCSs). This kind of interference is caused by signals 
from neighboring GCSs or other devices that use the 
same radio frequency (e.g., 2.4 GHz) interfering UAV-
GCS communication channel. 
 Interference among neighboring communicating UAVs. 
Communicating UAVs will send or receive signals to 
and from the established communication links; 
meanwhile, they will receive and send signals to 
unintended neighboring UAVs, which cause mutual 
interference. 
 UAVs inter-cell interference. When UAVs mounted 
with transceivers are applied as base stations, they will 
broadcast radio signals with specific bands that will be 
detected by mobile users. If adjacent UAVs broadcast 
using the same bands, they will cause interference at the 
 
 
Fig. 6.  (a) Beaconing period durations at equilibrium for different values of encounter rates using Nash bargain solution. (b) The utility achieved by the UAV using 
the cooperative, non-cooperative, and always-beaconing strategies 
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overlapping edges of the coverage areas. In summary, a 
user at the overlapping edges of adjacent cells, while 
communicating through one UAV cell, will experience 
signal interference from the adjacent UAV cell. Inter-
cell interference coordination in UAV-based networks 
remains a challenge even when the channel frequency 
reuse technique is applied due to the mobility nature of 
UAVs. 
 UAVs self-interference. Another major source of 
interference on UAVs are the components installed on 
UAV. For instance, for small size UAVs, the global 
navigation satellite system antennas are installed in close 
proximity to other electronic systems. 
 Interference from an intruder. Since UAVs operate in the 
sky, they are more vulnerable to interference from the 
jammer due to the fact that in the sky signals can 
propagate over longer distances than they would on the 
ground. Different from the ground where signals can be 
hindered by mountains, trees, buildings and other 
obstacles, in the sky the intruders’ signal have a potential 
to reach further unhindered. 
 Different from the ground-based communication 
infrastructures, in the air, interfered UAVs can result into 
serious consequences. Moreover, interference seriously affects 
the network transmission capacity and performance. Reducing 
interference can improve UAV network security, minimize 
conflict and retransmission of signals, thus reducing the waste 
of energy and improving the network throughput. The 
traditional game models applied in UAV-aided wireless 
communications networks are not sufficient when analyzing 
and solving interference problem in a massive UAVs 
communication networks due to, but not limited to the 
following reasons. 
 The immense signaling and communication overhead 
caused by information exchange among different UAVs 
(players) in the network. 
 In large-scale multi-agent networks, the traditional 
approaches are impractical. In these games, every player 
should collect the information of all other players, which 
can result in complex algorithms that are considerably 
harder to solve when dealing with massive networks. 
 As the number of UAVs increases, the size of the payoff 
matrix increases, therefore the time required for the 
game to reach equilibrium also increases. 
Therefore, it becomes necessary to rethink of the different 
analytical models of tackling the problem in future massive, 
dynamic and complex UAVs wireless networks and move 
toward models that fit the characteristics of the network more 
appropriately. Thus, we propose to use the concepts of mean 
field game (MFG) [15] to study the characteristics of 
interference and design interference aware management 
scheme among UAVs in large wireless communication with 
UAVs networks.  
B. Mean Field Game for Interference Management in 
Massive UAV Networks 
There is a growing interest for various enterprises and 
government institution in using UAVs for different purposes. 
The existing and expected uses of UAVs and huge investment 
in the drone industry indicates that the future where hundreds if 
not thousands of drone will be operating in the air is near. 
Massive UAVs will also be used as part of the coming of 5G 
networks, to enhance capacity, increase data rates, minimize 
latency, improve connectivity for a massive number of devices, 
reduced energy and cost, and boost the quality of experience 
(QoE).  
Therefore, MFG will be an appropriate method for 
addressing different challenges in such massive UAV networks. 
This is because in MFG the mean field value of space-time 
dynamics of context approaches the real value as the number of 
players increase. In addition, in the MFG framework, the 
concept of mean field can characterize the space-time dynamics 
of context, for example, two-dimensional interference and 
energy states, which helps the generic player to make an 
optimal decision responding only to the mean field, instead of 
the strategies of all the other players. Another unique advantage 
of the introduced novel game is that MFG-based decision-
making is distributed with less signaling overhead. 
By definition, MFGs are a special form of differential games, 
where each player has a state, a set of actions, and a control 
policy. The control policy maps every state into an action over 
a pre-defined period of time. Instead of modeling each players’ 
interaction with every other player, MFG models an 
individuals’ interaction with the effect of the collective 
behavior of all the players. Thus, at each step of the game, the 
mean field is simply the fraction of players at every state. 
Contrarily to traditional games, MFG can be used to model and 
analyze the interaction between individual and collective 
behaviors of a large number of rational entities [15]. 
In finding a solution to the interference problem, it is 
necessary to learn about the behavior of the interference. We 
intend to learn the characteristics of interference that 
communicating UAVs experience from the neighboring GCSs, 
mobile devices, and neighboring communicating UAV. We will 
use the MFG to study and develop a distributed interference-
aware scheme. In our model, we will consider a massive UAV-
aided wireless network in which UAVs communicate with 
GCS, other UAVs and provide services to the mobiles. In this 
model, we will focus on the interference that a UAV 
communicating with GCS experiences from neighboring GCSs. 
The mean field approximation method will be used to approach 
the aggregate interference from other links to UAV-GCS 
communication channel and get the corresponding cost 
function. 
UAV-GCS links representing a communication pairs are 
considered as players. They are rational policymakers whose 
number is arbitrarily large and even goes to infinite. The actions 
are the possible transmit powers corresponding to UAV-GCS 
pairs. Each transmitter determines the power it transmits at any 
time to minimize the cost function. State space of player is 
defined as the interference introduced by other links to UAV-
GCS link and the interference from UAV-GCS link to other 
links. A control policy is used to minimize the average cost over 
the time interval in one-dimensional states. The cost function 
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for interference management in massive UAV communications 
will be formulated by considering both the achieved signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) performance and the 
transmit power of the UAV-GCS pair. 
The interaction of players with the mean field is modeled by 
a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, and the movement 
of the mean field function according to the players' actions is 
defined by a Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation. The 
corresponding HJB and FPK equations are derived and solved 
to obtain the mean field equilibrium (MFE). The finite 
difference method and Lagrange relaxation method will be used 
to solve the FPK and HJB equations respectively. 
C. Other Research and Implementation 
Due to the promising development of IoT and mobile 
Internet, there exist novel communication requirements of 
ultra-reliable low latency communications (uRLLC), massive 
machine-type communication (eMTC), and enhanced mobile 
broadband (eMBB). Meanwhile, UAVs are also expected to be 
used to assist vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) and 
wireless sensor networks (WNS). It is necessary to study the 
characteristics and advantages of deploying UAVs to assist 
these networks. Novel game-theoretic approaches can find 
wider applications. 
In the future, it is also necessary to design and implement a 
prototype of the UAVs-aided wireless communications 
network, and then evaluate the feasibility of game-theoretic 
approaches. Then, a series of experiments will be practically 
conducted and the results can be collected and analyzed to 
further understand the pros and cons of game-theoretic 
approaches. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Game theory offers a suitable tool that can be used to effectively 
model the interaction between autonomous wireless 
communication UAVs. Game theory always leads to 
sophisticated distributed decision processes. This article 
summarized the typical advantages and typical challenges of 
UAVs communications, where we concentrated on the recent 
applications of game theory for wireless communications with 
UAVs. We presented a classification of the existing game 
approaches to various novel communication challenges with 
UAVs. For each game-theoretic application, we characterized 
the rational behavior, analyzed equilibrium solutions, and 
presented the distributed schemes of the UAVs. Finally, we 
simulated a use case to show the potential benefits of game 
theory. We highlighted the interference management challenge, 
presented the novel mean field game-theoretic approaches, and 
lastly, looked forward the future of game theory for wireless 
communications with UAVs. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] S. Morgenthaler, T. Braun, Z. Zhao, T. Staub, and M. Anwander, 
Vehicles," IEEE Globecom Workshops, Anaheim, CA, USA, Dec. 
2012, pp. 1603-1608. 
[2] Y. Zeng, R. Zhang, and T. J. Lim, "Wireless Communications with 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Opportunities and Challenges," IEEE 
Commun. Mag., vol. 54, no. 5, May 2016, pp. 36-42. 
[3] W. Saad, Z. Han, T. Basar, M. Debbah, and A. Hjungnes, "A Selfish 
Approach to Coalition Formation Among Unmanned Air Vehicles 
in Wireless Networks," in Proc. Int. Conf. on Game Theory for 
Networks (GameNets), May 2009, pp. 259-267. 
[4] P. Semasinghe, S. Maghsudi, and E. Hossain, "Game Theoretic 
Mechanisms for Resource Management in Massive Wireless IoT 
Systems," IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 55, no. 2, Feb. 2017, pp. 121-
127. 
[5] J. Parras, J. Val, S. Zazo, J. Zazo, and S. V. Macua, "A New 
Approach for Solving Anti-jamming Games in Stochastic 
Scenarios as Pursuit-evasion Games," IEEE Statistical Signal 
Processing Workshop (SSP), Palma de Mallorca, Palma, Spain, 
Jun. 2016, pp. 1-5. 
[6] D. Athukoralage, I. Guvenc, W. Saad, and M. Bennis, "Regret 
Based Learning for UAV assisted LTE-U/WiFi Public Safety 
Networks," IEEE Global Commun. Conf. (GLOBECOM), 
Washington, DC, USA, Dec. 2016, pp. 1-7. 
[7] H. Sedjelmaci, S. M. Senouci, and N. Ansari, "Intrusion Detection 
and Ejection Framework Against Lethal Attacks in UAV-Aided 
Networks: A Bayesian Game-Theoretic Methodology," IEEE 
Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, vol. 18, no. 5, 
May 2017, pp. 1143-1153. 
[8] S. Koulali, E. Sabir, T. Taleb, and M. Azizi, "Green Strategic 
Activity Scheduling for UAV Networks: A Sub-modular Game 
Perspective," IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 54, no. 5, May 2016, pp. 
58-64. 
[9] S. Bhattacharya and T. Basar, "Game-theoretic Analysis of an 
Aerial Jamming Attack on a UAV Communication Network," In 
Proc. Of American Control Conference, Baltimore, MD, USA, Jun. 
2010, pp. 818-823. 
[10] D. H. Choi, S. H. Kim, and D. K. Sung, "Energy-efficient 
Maneuvering and Communication of a Single UAV-based Relay," 
IEEE Trans. On Aerospace and Electronic Systems, vol. 50, no. 3, 
Jul. 2014, pp. 2320-2327. 
[11] P. B. Charlesworth, "A Non-cooperative Game to Coordinate the 
Cover- age of two Communications UAVs," IEEE Military 
Commun. Conf., San Diego, CA, USA, Nov. 2013, pp. 668-673. 
[12] P. B. Charlesworth, "Using Non-Cooperative Games to Coordinate 
Communications UAV," Workshop-Wireless Networking and 
Control for Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles, Austin, TX, USA, 
Dec. 2014, pp. 1463-1469. 
[13] A. Giagkos, M. S. Wilson, E. Tuci, and P. B. Charlesworth, 
“Comparing Approaches for Coordination of Autonomous 
Communications UAVs," Int. Conf. on Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(ICUAS), Arlington, VA, USA, Jun. 2016, pp. 1131-1140. 
[14]  C. Yang, J. Li, A. Anpalagan, and M. Guizani, "Point Power 
Coordination for Spectral-and-Energy Efficiency in Heterogeneous 
Small Cell Networks: A Bargaining Game-Theoretic Perspective," 
EE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol.5, no.2, 2016, pp. 1364-1376. 
[15] C. Yang, J. Li, M. Sheng, A. Anpalagan, and J. Xiao, "Mean Field 
Game-Theoretic Framework for Interference and Energy-Aware 
Control in 5G Ultra-Dense Networks," IEEE Wireless Commun., 
vol. 99, Sept. 2017, pp. 1-8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
